London Borough of Richmond upon Thames

# BOROUGH RISK REGISTER

September 2024

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Notes:

This Borough Risk Register is collectively owned by the Category 1 Responders (as defined by Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) within the Richmond & Wandsworth Borough Resilience Forum area.

#### Official

| Conter  | nts  |    |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
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# Member Agencies of the Borough Resilience Forum

# Category 1 Responders

| LB Richmond upon Thames             | HM Coastguard                      | South West London and St George's |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <ul> <li>Local Authority</li> </ul> | Environment Agency                 | Mental Health NHS Trust           |
| LB Wandsworth – Local Authority     | UKHSA                              | St. Georges University Hospitals  |
| Metropolitan Police Service         | NHS England (London)               | NHS Foundation Trust              |
| British Transport Police            | West Middlesex University Hospital | NHS Hounslow and Richmond         |
| London Fire Brigade                 | Kingston Hospital                  | Community Healthcare Trust        |
| London Ambulance Service            |                                    | Southwest London Integrated Care  |
|                                     |                                    | Board                             |
| October 2 Decreanders               |                                    |                                   |
| Category 2 Responders               |                                    |                                   |
| Port of London Authority            | SW Trains                          | Thames Water                      |
| The London Heliport                 | UK Power Networks                  |                                   |
| Transport for London                | National Grid                      |                                   |
| Met Office                          |                                    |                                   |
| Non actomoticad Ormania ations      |                                    |                                   |
| Non-categorised Organisations       |                                    |                                   |
| British Red Cross                   | Military Liaison                   | Achieving for Children (Local     |
| St. Johns Ambulance                 | Rugby Football Union               | Authority Education Provider)     |
| Royal National Lifeboat Institution | Royal Parks                        |                                   |

# **Borough Risk Register**

## 1 Introduction

Risk assessment is a core capability for London and underpins the work of the London Resilience Forum. The assessment of risk contained in the London Risk Register drives the development of work to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from those scenarios.

The London Risk Register is made publicly available to assist communities and businesses in developing their own emergency and business continuity arrangements and is used as a basis for the creation of Borough Risk Registers in most Boroughs across London. It is available to download from the London Resilience website.

#### **Borough Risk Register**

The Richmond Borough Risk Register is used by Richmond Borough Resilience Forum to assist in prioritisation of resilience activities for higher rated risks. It provides additional information not available in the London Risk Register for the purpose of developing local arrangements.

Communities and businesses are encouraged to use the Borough Risk Register to inform their own resilience arrangements and business continuity plans and is the reason for Borough Risk Register being made publicly available.

The risks included in the Borough Risk Register represent 'reasonable worst-case scenarios' and their inclusion in the register does not mean that they are going to happen, or that if they did do that they would be as serious as the descriptions included here. The reasonable worst-case scenarios are nationally developed and informed by historical and scientific data, modelling, trend surveillance and professional expert judgment.

The Richmond Borough Risk Register is structured to closely follow the format and content of the London Risk Register so that it takes full advantage of the work carried out at by the experts in the London Risk Advisory Group.

Each risk is assigned a score for impact and likelihood. Impact is ranked from Limited (1) to Catastrophic (5) and likelihood by how likely a risk is to happen over the next 2 years. These scores are combined to give an overall risk rating.

Richmond's Borough Risk Register differs from the London Risk Register in two respects:

- If the local risk in the Borough is assessed by the Borough Resilience Forum to be higher or lower than the rating provided in the London Risk Register.
- If the direct impacts of a risk would be realized exclusively outside of the Borough.

The <u>UK National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies</u> provides an outline of risk affecting the UK as a whole.

# 2 About Richmond upon Thames

The London Borough of Richmond upon Thames is part of the Southwest Sub-Region along with the London Boroughs of Croydon, Kingston, Merton, Sutton, and Wandsworth. It is part of the Richmond and Wandsworth Borough Resilience Forum.



#### **Social Factors**

- Ranked as one the least densely populated borough in London (Estimated pop 198,000.)
- The black, minority and ethnic (BME) groups in Richmond constitute 16% of population, with no ethnical specific majorities.
- SW LRA standard of living is above London average.
- Richmond is identified as one of the least deprived boroughs in the Capital.

#### Environmental Factors

- Borough is made up of 35% parkland (incl. Richmond Park).
- Substantial flooding risk in this Borough (Thames tidal and non-tidal).
- Twickenham, Richmond, Kingston, and Wandsworth town centres are all close to the Thames, hence flooding vulnerability.
- Surface water flood risk continually being assessed as a significant risk in area.
- Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) in Richmond are susceptible to contamination from sewage and other pollutants should there be flooding.

#### **Economic Infrastructure**

- Richmond, Twickenham, and Teddington two centres have significant numbers of shops and businesses.
- Large number of tourists visiting different sites, including Hampton Court Palace, Kew Gardens, and the National Archives.
- Major sporting venues include Twickenham RFU and Harlequins Rugby Grounds.

#### **Transport Infrastructure**

- Very well-developed main line rail infrastructure (61 main line stations), including the Southwest Line connecting boroughs to each other and Central London.
- Underground only two termini's, one being in Richmond.
- Important roads including, A3 (connects the M25 to Central London), A24, A316, and the A217.
- Extensive public bus network.
- Significant number of road and rail bridges cross the Thames (closure of one or more would be extremely disruptive).
- Under Heathrow flights Paths and river traffic on the Thames.

#### Official

#### **Hazardous Sites**

- Hampton water treatment plant lower tier COMAH site, large quantities of toxic chemicals, poses a risk to low lying areas.
- High pressure gas pipeline in Richmond (also present in Kingston) and the National Physical Laboratory.
- Sewage treatment plant on Mogden Lane in Hounslow with potential to affect resident of Richmond and also the River Crane under REPPIR (Radiation emergency preparedness and public information regulations) guidelines.
- The nearest top tier COMAH site is at Walton on Thames and could affect the borough in the event of a major incident there via water and or air pollution.

#### Borough Risk Register: Risk Matrix (High-Level Summary)

R62 - Reservoir/dam collapse R50a – Failure of national electricity R78 - Pandemic (5) Catast rophic R76 - Drought transmission system R89 – High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse T7 – Large Scale CBRN Attacks **R45–** Aviation Collision R51 – Failure of Gas Supply Infrastructure R75c - Surface water flooding **RL4 -** Loss of mortuary **T7** - Catastrophic unconventional H5 – Fuel Supply Infrastructure **R75b -** Fluvial flooding provision attackR79 – Outbreak of an emerging (Pipeline) L54b – Fire in large public and commercial **R71 –** Severe Space weather infectious disease **R66** – Radiation releases from buildings **R73** – High Temperatures and overseas accidents Heatwaves R55 - Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site (4) Significant R58 – Explosion at a highpressure gas pipeline R57 – Accidental Large Toxic Chemical Release HL22 - Building collapse **R63 - Water Infrastructure Failure** R40 - Railway accident T3 - Attacks on transport system Impact HL23 - Bridge collapse **RL3 -** Fire in buildings containing asbestos **R74 –** Low temperatures and heavy **R67 -** Volcanic eruption HL30 - Localized explosion at a snow R65 – Major Fire L54a – Fires in purpose built high-rise natural gas main. R75a – Coastal Flooding R60 - Localized industrial accident involving flats R96 - The growth and spread of anti-**RL1 -** Fire involving acetylene small toxic release R82 – Public Disorder cylinders. R64 - Food Supply Contamination microbial resistance. R72 – Storms and Gales **R59** – Fires or explosion at an R77 – Poor air quality L71b- Minor aviation crash **T2** – Attacks on Infrastructure (3) Moderate onshore fuel pipeline HL10 – Local accident on motorways HL105 - Complex built environments **T6** – Medium Scale CBRN Attacks L66 - Radioactive incident caused and major truck roads **R50b** – Regional Failure of the Electricity by mishandling of radioactive **R44** – Accident involving high Network consequence dangerous goods material R47 – Disruption of Space Based Services L19 - Groundwater flooding

Richmond Risk Register – September 2024

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| (2)<br>Minor       | R42 – Major Maritime pollution<br>incident<br>R38 – Insolvency affecting fuel<br>supply<br>R61 – Accidental release of a<br>hazardous pathogen        |                   | <ul> <li>HL26a - Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases</li> <li>R83 – Industrial action (public transport).</li> <li>L54e – Major fire in care homes and hospitals</li> <li>T4 – Cyber attacks</li> <li>R37a – Insolvency of Supplier of Critical Services to Public Sector</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>R87 – Reception and integration of<br/>British Nationals arriving from overseas</li> <li>T5 - Small scale unconventional attacks</li> <li>R55a – Technology failure at<br/>systemically important bank</li> <li>R80 – Systemic Financial Crisis</li> <li>R36 – Major social care provider failure</li> <li>R37b – Collapse of a major government<br/>contractor</li> <li>R85 – Industrial action (Prison Staff)</li> <li>R66 - Wildfires</li> <li>R39 – Failure of a Supplier of CNI<br/>Chemicals</li> </ul> | L54c — Fires involving landfill<br>waste processing sites T1 –<br>Attack on PALs |
|--------------------|---|-------------------|--|--|--|
| <br>(1)<br>Limited | RL2 - Misuse and release of toxic<br>or corrosive chemicals<br>R54 – Radiation Exposure from<br>transported, stolen or lost goods<br>R68 – Earthquake |                   | R32 -Major interference in UK<br>democratic process<br>R41 – Larger Passenger Vessel<br>Accident<br>HL21 – Land Movement   |  |  |
|                    | (1)<br>Low  | (2)<br>Medium Low | (3)<br>Medium  | (4)<br>Medium High   | (5)<br>High  |
|                    |   |                   | Likelihood   |  |  |

#### Official

Each risk is assigned a Risk ID which is nationally consistent and relates to a more detailed and protectively marked, Individual Risk Assessment.

| HL-       | ID<br>National<br>Local Response<br>ocally Applicable | Outcome Description/Variation and Further<br>Information<br>Describes the key consequences of the risk,<br>provides additional detail around local variation<br>from national planning assumptions | Oft | act Sc<br>ne risk<br>seque | Existing risk   | Review Dates<br>Date of last re<br>and date of ne<br>scheduled rev | eview<br>ext                     |
|-----------|---|--|-----|----------------------------|---|--|----------------------------------|
| Ref<br>ID | Risk sub-<br>category (Lead<br>Assessor)              | Outcome Description/<br>Variation and Further Information  |     | Impact<br>isk<br>ting      | Controls in Place   |  | Last<br>Review<br>Next<br>Review |
| I R       | isk Category  | Industrial and Enviro<br>Likelihood Score<br>Of the risk occurr<br>the next 5 years  |     | Ris<br>Sca                 | ution Incidents<br>k Rating<br>le based on<br>lihood and impact |  |                                  |

| 4 | Borough               | Risk Register  |            |        |                   |                                  |
|---|-----------------------|--|------------|--------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
|   | Risk sub-<br>category | Outcome Description/<br>Variation and Further Information <i>(Lead Assessor)</i> | Likelihood | Impact | Controls in Place | Last<br>Review<br>Next<br>Review |
|   |                       |  | Ri<br>Rat  |        |                   | Lead                             |

# Accident Hazards

|      |                     |   | 2   | 3    | Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005   |  |
|------|---------------------|---|-----|------|--|--|
| R65  | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Major Fire</b><br>Major Fire A major fire in a building resulting in up to 140 fatalities<br>and 200 casualties, significant damage to the building affected and<br>disruption to local transport services for up to a week. | Med | lium | <ul> <li>Fire Safety Approved Document B</li> <li>Fire &amp; Rescue Services Act 2004</li> <li>LFB Guidance Note 29</li> <li>LFB Operational tactical and building plans</li> <li>LFB Urban Search &amp; Rescue Teams (USAR)</li> <li>Fire Service National Resilience Assets</li> <li>LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)</li> <li>Local Authority Dangerous Structures Engineer</li> <li>Casualty Bureau</li> <li>London Frameworks including:</li> <li>Strategic Coordination Protocol</li> <li>Mass Fatalities Framework</li> <li>Humanitarian Assistance Framework</li> </ul> |  |
| L54a | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Fires in purpose built high-rise flats</b><br>Major fire in block of flats containing 80 compartments. Potential for<br>150-200 fatalities and 200 casualties  | 4   | 3    | <ul> <li>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005</li> <li>Fire Safety Approved Document B</li> <li>Fire &amp; Rescue Services Act 2004</li> <li>LFB</li> </ul>  |  |

|      |                     |   | н        | gh        | <ul> <li>LFB Guidance Note 29</li> <li>LFB Operational tactical and building plans</li> <li>LFB Urban Search &amp; Rescue Teams (USAR)</li> <li>Fire Service National Resilience Assets</li> <li>LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)</li> <li>Local Authority Dangerous Structures Engineer</li> <li>Casualty Bureau</li> <li>London Frameworks including:<br/>Strategic Coordination Protocol<br/>Mass Fatalities Framework</li> <li>Humanitarian Assistance Framework</li> </ul>  |                             |
|------|---------------------|---|----------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|
| L54e | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Major fire in care homes and hospitals</b><br>Fire causing up to 20 fatalities of vulnerable<br>people in residence causing the closure of<br>an entire hospital or care home. | 3<br>Med | 2<br>Jium | <ul> <li>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005</li> <li>Fire Safety Approved Document B</li> <li>Fire &amp; Rescue Services Act 2004</li> <li>LFB Guidance Note 29</li> <li>LFB Operational tactical and building plans</li> <li>LFB Urban Search &amp; Rescue Teams (USAR)</li> <li>Fire Service National Resilience Assets</li> <li>LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)</li> <li>Local Authority Dangerous Structures Engineer</li> <li>Casualty Bureau</li> <li>London Frameworks including:<br/>Strategic Coordination Protocol<br/>Mass Fatalities Framework</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| R55  | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Fuel Supply Infrastructure (Pipelines)</b><br>Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site, or at a site storing<br>flammable and/or toxic liquids.                           | 1<br>Med | 4<br>Jium | <ul> <li>Control of Major Accident Hazard 1999 (COMAH)<br/>Regulations</li> <li>The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere<br/>Regulations 2002</li> <li>Petroleum Regulations</li> <li>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005</li> <li>Site Operators on-site contingency plans</li> <li>Emergency Services specialist resources</li> </ul>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| R53  | Accident<br>Hazards | Radiation Releases from Overseas Accidents<br>A radioactive substance release that  | 1        | 4         | • REPPIR  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026        |

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|     |                     | affects the UK because of a nuclear<br>accident overseas e.g. at a waste storage<br>facility. UK outcome could include initial<br>food restrictions, potential transport<br>disruptions and impacts to the health<br>system including the presentation of<br>worried well.  | Med      | lium      |                       |  | LFB                         |
|-----|---------------------|---|----------|-----------|-----------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| R59 |                     | Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel<br>Pipeline (risk to align with 2022 NSRA following risk review in<br>2024-2025)<br>Accidental fire or explosion occurs at an<br>onshore fuel pipeline close to a populated<br>area affecting an area around the<br>explosion of up to 1km.  | 1<br>Mec | 3<br>Jium | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>• | Control of Major Accident Hazard 1999 (COMAH)<br>Regulations.<br>The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere<br>Regulations 2002<br>Petroleum Regulations<br>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005<br>Site Operators on-site contingency plans<br>Emergency Services specialist resources | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| R55 | Accident<br>Hazard  | <b>Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site</b><br>Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site, or at a site storing<br>flammable and/or toxic liquids   | 1<br>Mec | 4<br>Jium | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>• | Control of Major Accident Hazard 1999 (COMAH)<br>Regulations.<br>The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere<br>Regulations 2002<br>Petroleum Regulations<br>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005<br>Site Operators on-site contingency plans<br>Emergency Services specialist resources | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| L66 | Accident            | Radioactive incident caused by mishandling of radioactive<br>material<br>A radioactive substance released in London because of an accident<br>at a site or during transportation of radioactive material.   | 1<br>Mec | 3<br>Jium | • • •                 | Radiation Monitoring Equipment deployed in affected areas.<br>London Fire Brigade Mass Decontamination Procedures<br>Scientific Technical Advice Cell (STAC)<br>Scientific Advice to Government in Emergencies (SAGE)<br>Radiation Protection Advisors   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| R58 | Accident<br>Hazards | Explosion at a high-pressure gas pipeline ( <i>risk to align with</i><br>2022 NSRA following risk review in 2024-2025)<br>Fire or explosion at a gas pipeline following ignition of gas under<br>high pressure. This could result in a crater, destruction of buildings<br>and evacuation of homes, as well as a cloud of gas/vapor. (London<br>Fire Brigade) | 1<br>Mec | 4<br>Jium | •                     | Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996.<br>Regulatory and industry measures including provision of maps<br>for excavation.<br>Emergency Services and other responder specialist resources.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |

| R4  | 5 Accident<br>Hazards  | <b>Aviation Collision</b><br>The worst-case scenario involves the collision of two commercial<br>aircrafts. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>   | 1<br>Med | 4<br>dium | <ul> <li>enter UK airspace.</li> <li>CAA Maintenance and Flight safety standards exceed ICAO recommendations</li> <li>Airline maintenance regimes subject to CAA scrutiny and</li> </ul>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>FB  |
|-----|------------------------|--|----------|-----------|--|-----------------------------|
|     |                        |  | _        |           | <ul> <li>regulation.</li> <li>Strict controls over London Approach.</li> <li>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005</li> </ul>   |                             |
| L5  | 4c Accident<br>Hazards | Fires involving landfill and waste processing sites<br>Major fire lasting several days with significant environmental and<br>local impacts.  | 5<br>Med | dium      | <ul> <li>Fire Safety Approved Document B</li> <li>Fire &amp; Rescue Services Act 2004</li> <li>LFB Guidance Note 29</li> <li>LFB Operational tactical and building plans</li> <li>LFB Urban Search &amp; Rescue Teams (USAR)</li> <li>Fire Service National Resilience Assets</li> <li>LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)</li> <li>Local Authority Dangarous Structures Engineer</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>FB  |
| Re  | 0 Accident<br>Hazards  | <b>Localized industrial accident involving small toxic release</b><br>Localized industrial accident involving small toxic release impacting<br>up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100<br>casualties. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i> | 2<br>Mea | 3<br>dium | Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>.FB |
| L54 | 4b                     | Fires in large public and commercial buildings   | 2        | 4         | Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005     Se  | Sep 2024                    |

|      | Accident<br>Hazards | Fire in large public building e.g. nightclub,<br>sports stadium, shopping center, transport<br>hub or other. Potential for up to 50<br>fatalities and 50 casualties.  | Hi       | gh        |   | Fire Safety Approved Document B<br>Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004<br>LFB Guidance Note 29<br>LFB Operational tactical and building plans<br>LFB Urban Search & Rescue Teams (USAR)<br>Fire Service National Resilience Assets<br>LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART)<br>Local Authority Dangerous Structures Engineer<br>Casualty Bureau<br>London Frameworks including:<br>Strategic Coordination Protocol<br>Mass Fatalities Framework<br>Mass Casualties Framework | Sep 2026<br>LFB             |
|------|---------------------|---|----------|-----------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| HL7  | Accident<br>Hazards | Industrial explosions and major fires<br>A fire or explosion at a flammable gas terminal (including LPG/LNG<br>storage sites) reaching 1km around site, causing up to 50 fatalities<br>and 150 casualties. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>   | 2<br>Med | 2<br>lium | • | Legislation: Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)<br>Regulations 1999.<br>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.<br>Building design and fire protection systems to prevent or limit the<br>spread of fire.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| L71b | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Minor Aviation Crash</b><br>Accident involving one commercial aircraft on takeoff or landing.<br>Aviation accident causing up to 50 fatalities and up to 250<br>casualties. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>   | 2<br>Med | 3<br>lium | • | Stringent controls on aircraft entering UK Airspace including the<br>mandatory use of Aircraft Collision Avoidance systems on heavy<br>aircraft.<br>UK flight separation rules.<br>CAA Maintenance and Flight safety standards.<br>Airline maintenance regimes.<br>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| HL10 | Accident<br>Hazards | Local accident on motorways and major trunk roads<br>Multiple vehicle incident causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 20<br>casualties (internal injuries, fractures, possible burns); closure of<br>lanes or carriageway causing major disruption and delay.<br>(Metropolitan Police Service) | 3<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh   | • | The Road Traffic Act 1988.<br>The Road Vehicle (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986.<br>The Traffic Management Act 2004.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS |

| R40 | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Railway Accident</b><br>Up to 30 fatalities and up to 100 casualties (fractures, internal<br>injuries – burns less likely). Possible loss of freight. Major disruption<br>to rail line including possible closure of rail tunnel.<br>( <i>British Transport Police</i> ) | 3 | igh | <ul> <li>Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.</li> <li>The Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000.</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>FfL |
|-----|---------------------|---|---|-----|---|-----------------------------|
|-----|---------------------|---|---|-----|---|-----------------------------|

| HL 22 | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Building Collapse</b><br>Collapse of a large building (high-rise block, shopping mall etc).<br>Up to 100 fatalities depending on the size and construction of<br>building, and occupation rates, and 350 casualties. Potential for<br>a number of persons to be trapped or missing. Localized loss of<br>power and other essential services. Local access routes affected<br>due to road closures. (Local Authorities) | 1<br>Mec | 3<br>lium | •       | Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities.<br>Construction, renovation, maintenance and demolition<br>standards and enforcement.<br>Emergency Services and other responder's specialist resources.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority                      |
|-------|---------------------|---|----------|-----------|---------|--|---|
| HL23  | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Bridge Collapse</b><br>Roads, access roads and transport infrastructure impassable for<br>considerable length of time. Severe congestion over wide<br>geographical area. Emergency access into / out of large,<br>populated areas severely restricted. Potential for a number of<br>persons to be trapped or missing. <i>(Local Authorities)</i>   | 1<br>Mec | 3<br>lium | •       | Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities.<br>Highways Act Regular inspections.<br>Height and weight restrictions and signs reduce the likelihood of<br>an incident.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority                      |
| HL30  | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Localized explosion at a natural gas main.</b><br>Localized explosion at a natural gas (low and medium pressure<br>main causing up to 100 fatalities and up to 100 casualties.<br><i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>   | 1<br>Mec | 3<br>lium | •       | Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996.<br>Regulatory and industry measures including provision of maps<br>for excavation.<br>Emergency Services and other responder specialist resources.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                                     |
| R41   | Accident<br>Hazards | Large Passenger Vessel Accident<br>Incident involving a passenger vessel in or close to UK waters<br>leading to the ship's evacuation (or partial evacuation). A major<br>incident involving a passenger vessel operating on the tidal<br>Thames within the London Resilience area may result in a major<br>loss of life by drowning. (Maritime and Coastguard Agency)  | 3<br>Lo  | 1<br>ow   | • • • • | Port of London Act 1968 (as amended),<br>General Directions for Navigating in the Port of London,<br>Port of London Thames Byelaws 2012,<br>International and national regulation of shipping aimed at<br>preventing accidents by the safe construction, equipment and<br>operation of ships by competent crews and shipping operators,<br>Regulations enforced by Flag States and subject to rigorous Port<br>State Control checks, coordinated in European waters MCA<br>(Class V legislation and High Speed Craft Code),<br>Port Marine Safety Code<br>Port of London Authority Emergency Plans | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Maritime<br>and<br>Coastguard<br>Agency |
| HL37  | Accident<br>Hazards | Maritime pollution incident<br>The release of significant quantities of hazardous<br>chemicals/materials as a result of a major shipping incident.  | 1        | 2         | •       | Port of London Thames Byelaws 2012<br>Dangerous Substances in Harbor Areas Regulations 1987<br>Dangerous Substances in Bulk Byelaws 1991   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>PLA                                     |

|         |                     | Fatalities and casualties unlikely. Significant<br>environmental/ecological damage expected. (Maritime and<br>Coastguard Agency)   | Lo             | w        | <ul> <li>Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Prevention, Response and<br/>Cooperation Convention) Regulations 1998</li> <li>On-site &amp; off-site COMAH plans for TDG European Chemicals,<br/>Dagenham.</li> <li>IMO HNS Convention – has not been ratified in the UK.</li> </ul>  |  |
|---------|---------------------|--|----------------|----------|--|--|
| HL105   | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Complex built environments</b><br>The following outcomes are possible as a consequence of a<br>major incident affecting large buildings / complex-built<br>environments. Incidents in these facilities have the potential to<br>trigger a complex chain of events that lead to serious<br>consequences for public safety. <i>(Local Authority)</i>  | 2<br>Med       | 3<br>ium | <ul> <li>Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.</li> <li>Management of Health &amp; Safety at Work Regulations<br/>1999.</li> <li>Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 &amp; guidance pursuant<br/>to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.</li> <li>Safety at Sports Grounds Act 1975 and Fire Safety and Safety of<br/>Places of Sport Act 1987.</li> <li>Local building safety systems and practices.</li> <li>Safety Advisory Groups in place at major sports grounds.</li> <li><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u></li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R47     | Accident<br>Hazards | <b>Disruption of space-based services</b><br>Collision of debris with a satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) leads<br>to a debris field that collides with and disrupts other satellites.<br>This causes a cascade of debris impacting other satellites and<br>creating further debris.  | 2<br>Med       | 3<br>ium | Monitoring by the International Space Station  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LAS                |
| Disease | Hazards             | ·  |                |          |  |  |
| R78     | Disease<br>Hazards  | Pandemic<br>An unmitigated respiratory pandemic with an unassumed<br>transmission route and high attack rate, with 4% of symptomatic<br>infections requiring hospital care and a case of fatality ratio of<br>2.5%. From start to finish the emergency stage of the pandemic<br>in the UK will last at least 9 months and potentially longer.<br>Approximately1.34 million people requiring hospital treatment,<br>possibly resulting in up to 840.000 deaths<br>) | 4<br>Ve<br>Hiç |          | <ul> <li>Public Health (Infectious Disease regulation)</li> <li>UKHSA Communicable Disease Outbreak Management<br/>Guidance (2023)</li> <li>Health and Social Care Act 2012</li> <li>Health and Care Act 2022</li> <li>Specific NHS Capacity and response planning</li> <li>Comprehensive surveillance systems</li> <li>London Pandemic Response Framework</li> <li>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</li> </ul>  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>UKHSA              |
| Ric     | hmond Risk R        | egister – September 2024   |                |          | Page 16 of 35  |  |

| R79     | Disease<br>Hazards | Outbreak of an Emerging infectious diseases<br>Based upon the experience of the outbreak of SARS and more<br>recently, MERS and Ebola, the worst case likely impact of such<br>an outbreak originating outside the UK would be cases occurring<br>amongst returning travelers and their families and close<br>contacts, with spread to health care workers within a hospital<br>setting. However, it is unlikely to present a wider threat<br>to the UK through sustained spread. (Public Health England)   | 4<br>Ve<br>Hiç |          | • | NHS Vaccination Program.<br>Specialist capability and capacity planning in NHS trusts.<br>Comprehensive surveillance systems and response<br>arrangements.<br>Local Outbreak Control Plans Planning  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>UKHSA                |
|---------|--------------------|---|----------------|----------|---|--|--|
| R80     | Disease<br>Hazards | Major Outbreak of Animal Disease<br>Disease introduced into a predominantly sheep area and<br>infected animals sold at market or moved to other premises<br>before disease is detected resulting in widely dispersed multiple<br>outbreaks. Assessment based on the need to cull and dispose<br>up to 4 million animals with up to 900 infected premises across<br>UK. Movement of all susceptible livestock prohibited unless<br>licensed. Economic and reputational losses to the agriculture<br>and food chain industry. Loss of disease-free status resulting in<br>EU and third country import bans on livestock and livestock<br>products from susceptible animals. | 2<br>Med       | 2<br>ium | • | Animal Health Act 1981.<br>Animal Health Act 2002.<br>Other secondary legislation and EU directives.<br>National disease control strategies.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authorities |
| Hazardo | us Materials (     | (HAZMAT)  |                |          |   |  |  |
| R57     | HAZMAT             | Accidental Large Toxic Chemical Release from a COMAH<br>site<br>A large release of toxic chemical gas occurs from an onshore<br>major hazard site manufacturing, using or storing dangerous<br>substances<br>. (London Fire Brigade)  | 1<br>Hię       | 4<br>gh  | • | Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2005<br>(COMAH).<br>Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.<br>Emergency Services and other responder specialist resources.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u><br>Hazmat response from within the borough and specialist<br>response from RRT (LFB) team. Visits by local LFB teams to log<br>where radiation sources are stored | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                  |

| R54 | HAZMAT | Radiation exposure from transported, stolen or lost goods<br>Incorrect handling of a stolen radioactive source leads to<br>accidental exposure to radioactive material. Three deaths after a<br>month and eight people requiring long term medical supervision.<br>Up to 500 'worried well'.   | 1<br>Lo  | 1<br>ow   | •<br>•<br>•<br>• | Radioactive Substances Act 1993.<br>High Activity Sealed Source Regulations 2005.<br>Arrangements for safe handling and disposal of radioactive<br>sources.<br>Radiation detectors at high-risk sites.<br>Environment Agency inspections of all major sources.<br>Emergency Services specialist resources.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                |
|-----|--------|--|----------|-----------|------------------|---|--|
| R61 | HAZMAT | Accidental work-related (laboratory) release of a hazardous<br>pathogen<br>Inadvertent release of a biological agent by an unrelated work<br>activity (eg, Legionella release due to improperly maintained<br>building environmental control systems) that causes up to 7<br>fatalities ad up to 500 people requiring hospital admissions.           | 1<br>L   | 2<br>ow   | •                | Health & Safety at Work Act 1974<br>Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002<br>The Notification of Cooling Towers and Evaporative Condenser<br>Regulations 1992 require the notification of wet cooling towers<br>and evaporative condensers to local authorities<br>Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999<br>Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences<br>Regulations | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>UKHSA              |
| R64 | HAZMAT | <b>Food Supply Contamination</b><br>A major contamination incident involving a microbiological<br>pathogen in the food chain. This would cause illness,<br>hospitalization, and possible fatalities over a period of time while<br>the source of the contaminate is identified, and an overall<br>response time of months <i>(Local Authorities)</i> | 2<br>Med | 3<br>Jium | •<br>•<br>•      | Food Safety Act 1990.<br>Imports monitored.<br>Local Authority Environmental Health Sampling.<br>Public Health England monitoring and surveillance.<br>Food Standards Agency plans.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R42 | HAZMAT | Major Maritime Pollution Incident<br>A large fully laden oil super tanker sinks in the approach to a port<br>leading to the spillage of 100,000 tons of crude oil into the sea<br>polluting up to 200km of coastline. The scenario assumes no<br>loss of access to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals or other                                    | 1        | 2         | •                | Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987.<br>Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and<br>Cooperation Convention) Regulations 1998.<br>PLA Thames Byelaws 2012<br>Port of London Oil Spill Contingency Plan   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>PLA                |

|     |        | major port infrastructure. (Maritime and Coastguard Agency)  | Lo       | w       | <ul> <li>Port State Control checks coordinated in European waters.</li> <li>All vessels navigating on the tidal Thames required PLA license.</li> <li>PLA Vessel Traffic Service.</li> <li>National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and</li> <li>Offshore Installations (2000).</li> <li>Oil Spill Contingency Plan Guidelines for Ports, Harbours &amp; Oil</li> <li>Handling Facilities.</li> </ul> |                          |
|-----|--------|--|----------|---------|---|--------------------------|
| R44 | HAZMAT | Accident involving high consequence dangerous goods<br>A road or rail tanker containing dangerous goods and/or "high<br>consequence" dangerous goods is involved in an accident<br>leading to fire and an explosion. Up to 5 fatalities and up to 150<br>casualties. The explosion will cause varying degrees of damage<br>to property and infrastructure depending on their distance from<br>the incident. This risk would result in a toxic plume/gas cloud<br>which would be harmful to the population, resulting in evacuation<br>of the immediate area. | 3<br>Hiş | 3<br>gh | <ul> <li>Management of Health &amp; Safety at Work Regulations 1999.</li> </ul>   | ep 2024<br>ep 2026<br>FB |

| Huma | anitarian Hazard | S   |          |           |                  |  |  |
|------|------------------|---|----------|-----------|------------------|--|--|
| R87  | Humanitarian     | Reception and integration of British Nationals arriving from<br>overseas<br>Influx of destitute/vulnerable British Nationals who are not<br>normally resident in the UK and cannot be accommodated by<br>family/friends. Up to 10,000 BNs not normally resident in the UK<br>returning to the UK within roughly a month following conventional<br>war, widespread civil unrest or sustained terrorism campaign<br>against British and other Western nationals. Around 2% of<br>returnees require statutory support including housing, health<br>services and access to welfare. | 4<br>Med | 2<br>Jium | •                | Local authority: Standard social care and emergency housing<br>arrangements. Existing mutual aid agreements in place across<br>London.<br>Other organizations: Full time officer located at Heathrow<br>(alongside Heathrow Travel Care) to consider the issue of<br>repatriation at ports. Position funded by the Foreign &<br>Commonwealth Office.<br>Heathrow Travel Care – a team of social workers.<br>Red Cross and FCO agreement on repatriation; Meet & greet<br>returning passengers at airport, arrange onward transport,<br>supported by the FCO. | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R82  | Humanitarian     | <b>Public Disorder</b><br>Large scale public disorder at site(s) in a single city, or in<br>multiple cities, occurring concurrently over several days. <i>(MPS)</i>   | 4<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh   | •<br>•<br>•<br>• | Specific riot and public order legislation.<br>Riot Compensation Act 2016.<br>Public Order Act 1986.<br>Police community tension monitoring processes.<br>Police community engagement teams.<br>Advice and guidance from police regarding legitimate protest from<br>event planners.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS                |

| Indus | strial Action         |   |         |           |   |   |  |
|-------|-----------------------|---|---------|-----------|---|---|--|
| R38   |                       | Insolvency Affecting Fuel Supply<br>Significant disruption to fuel supplies<br>because of insolvency at a key refinery or<br>terminals. Primary impacts are disruption<br>to the production and/or supply of refined<br>fuel products. Shortages can cause<br>elevated short-term demand.   | 1<br>L  | 2<br>ow   |   | Reserve fleet of Road tankers<br>Temporary financial assistance to some orgs to maintain<br>fuel supplies while market responds.<br>Central government arrangements for emergency fuel<br>deliveries from downstream oil industry to maintain<br>deliveries to key sites. | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R84   | Industrial Action     | Industrial action (firefighters)<br>A national fire strike in England for a<br>continuous eight-day period with loss of<br>life directly attributable to a weakened<br>response by individual fire and rescue<br>services, and reputational impact on<br>government   | 2<br>Me | 2<br>dium | • | Police Act (1996)<br>RCN Code on Industrial Action<br>Alternative emergency cover protocols for the Fire Brigade<br>Organizational Business Continuity Arrangements<br>Recall to active duty  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                |
| R86   | Industrial Action     | <b>Industrial Action (Fuel supply)</b><br>Actual or threatened significant disruption to the distribution of<br>fuel by road, including as a result of industrial action by fuel<br>tanker drivers. Retail filling stations, depending on the extent of<br>the disruption and their locations and assuming no panic-buying,<br>would likely run out of fuel within 4-5 days. <i>(Local Authority)</i> | 2<br>Me | 2<br>dium | • | Legal requirements re: conduct of industrial disputes.<br>Stocks of contingency fuel to varying degrees.<br>National Emergency Plan for Fuel.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R85   | Industrial<br>Actions | Industrial action (Prison Staff)<br>Industrial action by operational prison<br>staff, leading to a shortfall of staff<br>available for duty for more than 24 hours  | 4<br>Me | 2<br>dium | • | Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994)  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MoJ                |
| R83   | Industrial Action     | Industrial action (Public Transport)  | 3       | 2         | • | Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026                       |

Infrastructure and Systems Failure

| _ |          |                 |  |     |      |                  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|----------|-----------------|--|-----|------|------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|   |          |                 | <b>Failure of Gas Supply Infrastructure</b><br>A technical failure or accident in an upstream oil/gas facility, gas<br>import pipeline terminal, or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import<br>reception facility leading to disruption in UK gas supplies.<br><i>(London Fire Brigade)</i> | 2   | 4    |                  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | R51      | Systems Failure |  | н   | igh  | •                | National Emergency Plan for Fuel.<br>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                        |  |  |  |  |
|   |          |                 | <b>Technology Failure at a Systemically Important Retail Bank</b><br>A technological failure which renders a   | 4   | 2    | •                | Financial services sector plans to deal with a surge in<br>demand for consumer facing financial services  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | R55<br>a | System Failure  | significant portion of a retail bank's IT<br>inoperable. Immediate effects last for 48-<br>72 hours, with some customers   | Med | dium | •<br>•<br>•<br>• | Communication plans to encourage consumer awareness<br>which can be coordinated between HM Treasury, the Bank<br>of England, and the Financial Conduct Authority<br>Collective incident response capability under the Authorities<br>Response Framework<br>Business Continuity Management plans for financial service<br>sector firms and their regulators. | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>London<br>Risk<br>Register |  |  |  |  |
|   |          |                 | Major Social Care Provider Failure<br>The failure of a major domiciliary care<br>provider affecting 20,000 vulnerable<br>people and their families   | 4   | 2    | •                | Contingency planning for a large-scale incident of this type would remain with central government   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026                               |  |  |  |  |
|   | R36      | System Failure  |  | Mee | dium | •                | Local authority service continuity plans  | Local<br>Authority                                 |  |  |  |  |
|   |          |                 | Collapse of a major government<br>contractor<br>The collapse of a major provider of<br>integrated facilities and construction<br>services for a range of private and public<br>organizations.  | 4   | 2    |                  | <ul> <li>Commercial business continuity and contingency plans</li> <li>Service continuity plans to maintain critical services</li> </ul>  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026                               |  |  |  |  |
|   | R37<br>b | System Failure  |  | Mee | dium | •                |   | Local<br>Authority                                 |  |  |  |  |

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| R63      | Systems Failure | Water Infrastructure Failure or loss of Drinking Water<br>Failure of water infrastructure or loss of drinking water caused by<br>the complete and relatively sudden loss of piped water supply or<br>the degradation of the piped supply such that it is unfit for human<br>consumption even after boiling. The RWCS assumes up to<br>350,000 people affected for between 24 hours and two weeks.   | 2<br>Mec | 3<br>lium      | •                                       | Water Industry Act 1991.<br>Security and Emergency Measures Direction 1998.<br>Water companies mutual aid arrangements in place.<br>Due to the high number of tower blocks in Wandsworth, the<br>impact is greater than stated in the London Risk Register.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Thames<br>Water |
|----------|-----------------|---|----------|----------------|---|--|---|
| R49      | Systems Failure | Simultaneous loss of all fixed and mobile forms of telecommunications<br>Loss of fixed and mobile telecommunications (both voice service and internet access) for up to 100,000 people for up to 72 hours. (Metropolitan Police Service)  | 3<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh        | •                                       | Civil Contingencies Act 2004.<br>Telephone provider demand and network capacity management<br>strategies.<br>National Emergency Alert for Telecoms.<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS             |
| R50<br>a | Systems Failure | Failure of the National Electricity Transmission System<br>(NETS)<br>A total national blackout due to the loss of the GB National<br>Electricity Transmission System caused by damage to or<br>technical failure of the transmission network. The technical<br>recovery process (Black Start) could take up to 5 days; however,<br>there is the potential for wide area power disruptions for up to 14<br>days, potentially affecting millions of consumers. <i>(London Fire</i><br><i>Brigade)</i>   |          | 5<br>ery<br>gh | • | <ul> <li>Testing and maintenance regime.</li> <li>London Power Supply Disruption Plan</li> <li>EDF Energy System Emergency Plan.</li> <li>EDF Energy Emergency Communication Plan.</li> <li>EDF Energy Black Start Plan.</li> <li>Business Continuity Plans for Category 1 and 2 Responders, businesses and other key organizations</li> <li>London Power Supply Disruption Plan</li> <li>Major Incident/Emergency Plans for Category 1 and 2 Responders.</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB             |
| R62      | Systems Failure | Reservoir/Dam CollapseA reservoir or dam collapses without warning resulting in almostinstantaneous flooding. Significant movement of debris(including vehicles) and sediment. Complete destruction of someresidential and commercial properties and serious damage of upto 500 properties. Several thousand other properties could beflooded. (Environment Agency)Although there are no major reservoir/dams in Richmond,there are numerous large reservoirs in close proximity thatcould affect the borough, statistically increasing thelikelihood. As a result, the likelihood is greater than statedin the London Risk Register. |          | 5<br>ery<br>gh | •                                       | Reservoirs Act, 1975.<br>Water Act, 2003.<br>Regular statutory inspections.<br><u>Met Office National Severe Weather Warning Service</u> .<br><u>Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall</u>  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>EA              |

|          |                 | <b>Regional Failure of the Electricity Network</b><br>A significant failure of the electricity network across one or more  | 2        | 3          | •   | Testing and maintenance regime.  |  |
|----------|-----------------|--|----------|------------|---|--|--|
| R50<br>b | Systems Failure | regions of Great Britain leading to the loss of electricity power of   |          | ery<br>igh | •<br>•<br>•   | EDF Energy System Emergency Plan.<br>EDF Energy Emergency Communication Plan.<br>EDF Energy Black Start Plan.<br>London Power Supply Disruption Framework  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                          |
| R39      | Systems Failure | <b>Failure of a supplier of CNI Chemicals</b><br>A supplier of chemicals essential for the operations of one or<br>more UK Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors suffers<br>from operational failure within days or weeks.  | 4<br>Mec | 2<br>dium  | •<br>9  | Water Sector running cross-Industry Chemicals Group<br>Water Sector running cross-Industry Chemicals Group Cross-<br>jovernment emergency response coordinated within Cabinet Office   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Utilities<br>Sector<br>Panel |
| R37<br>a | Systems Failure | <b>Insolvency of Supplier of Critical Services to public sector</b><br>Insolvency of a supplier of critical IT services supporting<br>operational systems or back-office processes integral to critical<br>national services.  | 3<br>Mec | 2<br>dium  | •   | National government guidance<br>FRC and other regulators of financial services   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority           |
| Natu     | ral Hazards     |  |          |            |   |  |  |
|          |                 | Storms and Gales<br>Storm force winds affect multiple regions for at least 6 hours<br>during a working day. Most inland and lowland areas experience<br>mean speeds in excess of 55mph and gusts in excess of 85mph.<br><i>(Local Authorities)</i>   | 4        | 3          | •   | Met Office Hazard Manager service.<br>Warning & informing internally and externally.   | Sep 2024   |
| R72      | Natural Hazards |  | Hi       | gh         | •<br>•<br>•<br>•                                    | <ul> <li>Category 1 &amp; 2 responders emergency response plans.</li> <li>Highways Agency response plans.</li> <li>TfL adverse weather plans.</li> <li>LFB USAR and Water Rescue capabilities.</li> <li>LAS HART.</li> </ul>   | Sep 2026<br>Met<br>Office                            |
| R74      | Natural Hazards | Low Temperatures and Heavy Snow<br>Low temperatures and snow (falling and lying) over substantial<br>areas of low-lying land, (below 300m) for at least one week. After<br>an initial fall of snow, there is further snowfall on and off for at<br>least 7 days. Most lowland areas experience some falls in<br>excess of 10cm at a time, with overall snow depth in excess of<br>30cm. This would coincide with a period of at least 7 consecutive<br>days with a daily mean temperature below -3°C. (Local<br>Authorities) | 3<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh    | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>• | <ul> <li>Met Office Hazard Manager service.</li> <li>Warning &amp; informing.</li> <li>Category 1 &amp; 2 responders emergency response and BCM plans.</li> <li>Category 1 &amp; 2 responders severe weather plans.</li> <li>Highways Agency, TFL and local authorities' winter road maintenance plans.</li> <li>Met Office forecasts &amp; National Severe Weather Warning Service TfL snow desk.</li> <li>Op GRIDLOCK to support motorists stranded on M25.</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Met<br>Office                |

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| R75<br>c | Natural Hazards | <b>Surface Water Flooding</b><br>Surface water flooding in a large metropolitan area caused by a<br>warm unstable atmosphere, most likely to occur in summer due<br>to the warmer atmosphere having a greater water holding<br>capacity, causes a pattern of convective rainfall events.   |         | 4<br>ery<br>gh | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>• | Flood and Water Management Act 2010<br>The Flood Risk Regulations 2009<br>Land Drainage Act 1991<br>Water Resources Act 1991<br>FFC – Flood Guidance Statements<br>New building developments controlled through planning guidelines<br>Multi Agency Flood Plans<br>London Strategic Flood Framework<br>National Flood Emergency Plan | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>EA                 |
|----------|-----------------|--|---------|----------------|----------------------------|--|--|
| R67      | Natural Hazards | Volcanic Eruption<br>Volcanic ash incursions for up to 25 days (assumed not to be<br>sulfur-rich) resulting in sporadic and temporary closures of<br>significant parts of UK airspace for up to a total of 15 days<br>(possibly non-consecutive) during a three-month eruption period.<br>( <i>Greater London Authority</i> )  | 4<br>Hi | 3<br>gh        | •                          | Met Office Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre forecasting.<br><u>CAA Volcanic Ash Safety Regime</u> .<br>Airline response plans.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |
| R71      | Natural Hazards | Severe Space Weather<br>Disruption to the electricity grid, resulting in two rural/coastal<br>sub-station disconnections each effecting communities of<br>approx. 100,000 people, with loss of power for 1 month or more<br>and Rota-disconnections for a further 1 month or more. Voltage<br>instability may also result in local blackouts, most likely in urban<br>areas lasting a few hours.<br>(Greater London Authority) |         | 4<br>ery<br>gh | •<br>•<br>•                | Electricity Industry monitoring and analysis of GIC.<br>Space Weather is assessed as part of the Daily Hazards<br>Assessment.<br>National Grid design standards and response arrangements.<br>Alternative positioning, navigation and timing signal systems.<br>Forecasting through Met Office Space Weather Operations<br>Centre.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Met<br>Office      |
| R77      | Natural Hazards | Poor Air Quality   | 3       | 3              | •                          | Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010   | Sep 2024                                   |

|   |          |                 | A 30-day period of elevated levels of either<br>ozone or PM2.5 causing increases in death<br>rates among vulnerable populations due to<br>poor air exacerbating respiratory and<br>cardio-vascular conditions.   | Hi       | gh        | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>• | European directive on ambient air quality and cleaner air<br>for Europe (2008/50/EC)<br>The UK Air Quality Strategy<br>Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010<br>Clean Air Act & Environmental Protection Act<br>Local authority air quality management areas and action<br>plans- London Mayor's Air Quality Strategy which<br>encompasses Ultra Low Emissions Zones and Low<br>Emission Neighborhoods<br>AirTEXT warning system<br>Local Air Quality Action Plans<br>Local Air Quality Monitoring Network<br>GLA Air Quality Action Plan | Sep 2026<br>EA              |
|---|----------|-----------------|--|----------|-----------|---|---|-----------------------------|
| F | 866      | Natural Hazards | <b>Wildfires</b><br>A major wildfire spreading over an area of over 100 hectares at<br>the urban-rural interface. Significant environmental impacts and<br>risks to residential property and essential services.   | 4<br>Mec | 3<br>lium | •   | London Fire Brigade borough specific rural strategies.<br>Specialist firefighting equipment and resources.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB |
| L | .19      | Natural Hazards | <b>Groundwater Flooding</b><br>Following unprecedented amounts of extended above average<br>rainfall throughout 3 winter months groundwater levels are<br>exceptionally high throughout London. The main areas of<br>concern are in the Southeast of London where the geology is<br>predominately chalk. | 3<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh   | •<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•<br>•      | Flood and Water Management Act 2010.<br>The Flood Risk Regulations 2009.<br>Land Drainage Act 1991.<br>Water Resources Act 1991.<br>The London Plan.<br>Civil Contingencies Act 2004.<br>Environment Agency Floodline.<br>FFC – Flood Guidance Statements.<br>Multi Agency Flood Plans.<br>London Strategic Flood Framework.<br>National flood emergency plan.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>EA  |
|   | R75<br>a | Natural Hazards | Coastal/Tidal Flooding   | 3        | 3         | •   | Flood and Water Management Act 2010.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026        |

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|          |                 | Localized tidal flooding resulting from sudden breach of a section<br>of the Thames tidal wall or embankment caused by a vehicle<br>collision or construction incident or a failure of a tidal flood gate<br>coinciding with high tides on the river Thames.   | Hi      | igh      |   | <ul> <li>The Flood Risk Regulations 2009.</li> <li>Land Drainage Act 1991.</li> <li>Water Resources Act 1991.</li> <li>The London Plan.</li> <li>Civil Contingencies Act 2004.</li> <li>Environment Agency Floodline.</li> <li>FFC – Flood Guidance Statements.</li> <li>Multi Agency Flood Plans.</li> <li>London Strategic Flood Framework.</li> <li>National flood emergency plan.</li> </ul>   | EA                            |
|----------|-----------------|--|---------|----------|---|--|-------------------------------|
| R75<br>b | Natural Hazards | Fluvial Flooding<br>Successive bands of frontal rainfall saturate river catchments<br>(soil moisture deficit is at zero) and fill river channels to full<br>capacity. High intensity heavy rainfall causes fluvial rivers in<br>London (tributaries to the Thames) to exceed channel capacity.<br>Flooding happens very quickly with little warning and time for<br>evacuations. <i>(Environment Agency)</i><br><i>Note:</i> the Beverley Brook here as the only Thames tributary with<br>potential to impact Richmond |         | 4<br>igh | -<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>-<br>- | <ul> <li>Flood and Water Management Act 2010.</li> <li>The Flood Risk Regulations 2009.</li> <li>Land Drainage Act 1991.</li> <li>Water Resources Act 1991.</li> <li>The London Plan.</li> <li>Civil Contingencies Act 2004.</li> <li>Environment Agency Floodline.</li> <li>FFC – Flood Guidance Statements.</li> <li>Multi Agency Flood Plans.</li> <li>London Strategic Flood Framework.</li> <li>National flood emergency plan.</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>EA    |
| HL<br>21 | Natural Hazards | Land Movement<br>Roads and access routes impassable for a time. Emergency<br>access into/out of large, populated areas difficult or impossible;<br>severe congestion over wide geographical area. Loss of power<br>and other essential services over wide geographical area.<br>Potential for a number of persons to be trapped or missing either<br>in landslides itself and/or in collapsed structures.<br>(London Fire Brigade)   | 3<br>La | 1<br>ow  | •   | <ul> <li>Land use planning restrictions.</li> <li>Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities.<br/>Construction, renovation, maintenance and demolition standards.</li> </ul>   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB   |
| R68      | Natural Hazards | Earthquake<br>An earthquake that results in the ground shaking with an<br>intensity of six on the European Macro seismic Scale (EMS), this   | 1       | 1        | L<br>•<br>•   | <ul> <li>ondon and national generic response plans</li> <li>Site clearance</li> <li>Evacuation &amp; Shelter</li> <li>Recovery</li> </ul>  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local |

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|          |                 | is classed as 'strong'. Many houses and buildings suffer slight<br>non-structural damage like hair-line cracks and falling of small<br>pieces of plaster.  | Lo       | ow             |                  | Iutual aid arrangements<br>pecialist fire and rescue assets  | Authoritie<br>s               |
|----------|-----------------|--|----------|----------------|------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| R73      | Natural Hazards | <b>High Temperatures and Heatwave</b><br>Daily maximum temperatures in excess of 32°C and minimum<br>temperatures in excess of 15°C over most of a region for around<br>2 weeks at least with 5 consecutive days where maximum<br>temperatures exceed 32°C. Up to 1,000 fatalities and 5,000<br>casualties, mainly amongst the elderly. There could be<br>disruption to power supply, telecommunications links and<br>transport infrastructure within the 2 weeks. <i>(Health)</i>   |          | 4<br>ery<br>gh | •<br>•<br>•<br>• | Health & Safety at Work Act 1974.<br>Public Health Act.<br>Heatwave Plan for England.<br>Long term planning for local authorities, CCG's and NHS.<br>Climate Change Adaption Strategy for London.<br>Heat Health Watch.<br>Department of Health Heatwave Plan for England.           | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>UKHSA |
| RR7<br>6 | Natural Hazards | <b>Drought</b><br>Following three consecutive and unprecedented dry winters London is<br>in a severe drought (level 4) situation. Emergency drought orders are in<br>place with millions of properties with severe water supply restrictions<br>and low water pressure (impacting supply to properties at high levels<br>and tower blocks). Increase of illnesses due to reduced use of water<br>impacting on hygiene levels, increased casualties and potentially<br>fatalities. Mental wellbeing impacts communities and public outrage<br>leads to some disorder issues.<br>( <i>Environment Agency</i> ) |          | 5<br>ery<br>gh | •                | Water Resources Act 1991.<br>DEFRA: Planning for Major Water and Wastewater Incidents in<br>England and Wales.<br>Drought Plan direction document.<br>Individual Water Company Drought Plans<br>London Drought Framework   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>EA    |
| Thre     | ats             |  |          |                |                  |  |                               |
| T1       | Threats         | Attacks on Publicly Accessible Locations (PALs)<br>PALs remain an attractive target for a terrorist attack. PALs by<br>their nature are easily accessible and offer the prospect for an<br>impact beyond the loss of life alone. Attacks are often (but not<br>always) carried out without prior warning.  | 5<br>Mec | 2<br>lium      | •                | Work of counter terrorism security advisors to raise awareness<br>and provide training.<br>Physical security measures where appropriate.<br>Emergency services response plans.<br>Emergency services specialist resources.<br>Counter terrorism liaison with relevant organizations. | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS   |
| T2       | Threats         | Attacks on infrastructure  | 4        | 3              |                  |  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026          |

|     |         | Many of the impacts which could result from industrial accidents, technical failure or severe weather could also result from a terrorist attack on infrastructure. The risk and impact vary according to the criticality of the infrastructure assets affected.  | Hi       | gh        | • | UK Government Counter Terrorism Strategy   | MPS  |
|-----|---------|--|----------|-----------|---|--|--|
| Т3  | Threats | Attacks on transport system<br>Conventional attacks on transport systems are judged to be the<br>more likely (however the likelihood of them affecting any one<br>individual is still extremely low).  | 4<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh   | • | responders.  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS/BTP            |
| т5  | Threats | Small Scale Unconventional Attacks<br>Mass impact terrorist attacks, whilst unlikely, cannot be ruled<br>out. The likelihood of terrorists successfully undertaking an<br>attack against a nuclear or chemical facility or obtaining<br>chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) or nuclear materials<br>remains low, but not negligible. If such attacks were successful,<br>their potential impact on the UK would be severe and<br>significantly greater than a conventional attack. The potential<br>impacts of an incident involving CBR agents will depend on a<br>range of factors including type and quantity of CBRN materials<br>used. This could range from small-scale (assassination or<br>poisoning) to mass-impact (widespread dispersion and<br>contamination) which is reflected in the scores. | 4<br>Mec | 2<br>lium | • | Well-developed specialist response capability.<br>Access to medical-countermeasures.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS                |
| R32 | Threats | Major interference in UK democratic process<br>A cyber-attack conducted by a hostile state<br>actor on a UK Electoral system during an<br>election period. The attack could cause<br>disruption to the electoral processes,<br>resulting in data loss or manipulation and<br>impact the result, or public confidence in the<br>result.   | 3<br>Lo  | 1<br>ow   | A | UK Electoral processes largely not reliant on computer<br>ystems vulnerable to this type of attack<br>24/7 managed Security Operations Centre is in place<br>nonitoring and mitigating against all attacks | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |

| Т4 | Threats | <b>Cyber Attacks</b><br>Cyber criminals engage in criminal activity to exploit weaknesses<br>in online systems, usually for financial gain. As well as using<br>technology to commit a crime (such as hacking to steal data),<br>offenders can also increase the scale and reach of a crime<br>(cyber-enabled fiscal fraud). States and state-sponsored threats<br>tend to be politically motivated and may attempt to access and<br>cause disruption to strategic systems across government and<br>other key sectors | 3<br>Mec | 2<br>lium | <ul> <li>National Cyber Security Strategy sets out the government<br/>response to ensuring that government, CNI, business and citizens<br/>are as resilient as possible to cyber threats. The National Cyber<br/>Security Centre, part of GCHQ, supports the most critical<br/>organizations in the UK to improve their cyber resilience. The<br/>NCSC also responds to cyber incidents to minimize harm to the<br/>UK, help with recovery and learn lessons for the future. Additional<br/>outreach to businesses and public regarding cyber threats and<br/>security Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure providing<br/>security and cyber security advice</li> </ul> | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS |
|----|---------|---|----------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|
| Т6 | Threats | Medium Scale CBRN Attacks<br>See T5 outcome description   | 4<br>Hi  | 3<br>gh   | See T5 controls in place  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>MPS |
| Τ7 | Threats | Large Scale CBRN Attacks<br>See T5 outcome description<br>A larger-scale CBRN attack has never happened in<br>the UK but would be more challenging to respond to<br>than other malicious attacks, due to the potential<br>health impacts and widespread environmental   | 3        | 5         | See T5 controls in place  | Sep 2024                    |
|    |         | contamination. CBRN events can also present<br>responders and those affected with significant levels<br>of uncertainty about what has happened, and the<br>scientific evidence may evolve as the incident<br>unfolds. This leads to widespread psychological<br>impacts including anxiety.  |          | ery<br>gh |   | Sep 2026<br>MPS             |

| Hos | Hostile State Activity |  |   |          |  |                       |  |  |  |
|-----|------------------------|--|---|----------|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|
|     |                        |  | 2 | 5        | Contingency planning for a large-scale incident of this type would | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026  |  |  |  |
| R89 | HSA                    | High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pusle (HEMP) |   | ry<br>gh | remain with central government                                     | Central<br>Government |  |  |  |

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| 5       | Local Risks |   |          |                 |   |   |  |
|---------|-------------|---|----------|-----------------|---|---|--|
| RL<br>1 | Local Risks | <b>Fire involving acetylene cylinders</b><br>Fire in industrial/commercial unit, with oxyacetylene cylinders<br>involved. Evacuation of 200m perimeter for up to 24 hours. Up<br>to 3 fatalities, 20 casualties. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>   | 1<br>Med | 3<br>dium       | • | Specialist firefighting equipment and resources.<br>Fire protection systems to prevent or limit the spread of fire.<br>It is highly unlikely that we would have to cool acetylene or any<br>unidentified cylinder for 24hrs this is a national policy change and<br>more likely to be significantly less in terms of time | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                |
| RL<br>2 | Local Risks | <b>Misuse and release of toxic or corrosive chemicals</b><br>Release of toxic or corrosive substances, either intentionally as a<br>means of chemical suicide or acid attack, or through the<br>accidental mixture of noxious chemicals. Potential for<br>substances to spread and harm further persons in the immediate<br>vicinity, possibly resulting in death or serious incapacitation<br>requiring hospital treatment. Victims and premises will require<br>decontamination. <i>(London Fire Brigade)</i> |          | 1<br>ow         | • | Specialist Emergency Services and other responder equipment<br>and resources.<br>Mass casualty decontamination resource within borough as a<br>response   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                |
| RL<br>3 | Local Risks | <b>Fire in buildings containing asbestos</b><br>Air borne asbestos particles present in the smoke plume and ash<br>following a fire at premises known to contain asbestos.<br><i>(London Fire Brigade)</i>  |          | 3<br>dium       | • | Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012.<br>Specialist firefighting equipment and resources.   | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>LFB                |
| RL<br>4 | Local Risks | Loss of mortuary provision<br>Loss or reduced capacity in public mortuary provision. (WBC)  |          | 4<br>ery<br>igh | • | Planning for emergencies in the capital   London City Hall  | Sep 2024<br>Sep 2026<br>Local<br>Authority |

# Risk omitted from London Risk Register

| Ref ID | Risk Sub-Category  | Rationale for Not Applicable<br>Status                             | Risk Sub-Category      |
|--------|--|--|------------------------|
| R77    | Gas Supply Infrastructure<br>(Installations)                         | No sites in Borough  | Accident               |
| L71a   | Large aircraft incident in proximity to airport                      | No sites in Borough  | Accident               |
| L71b   | Small aircraft incident in proximity to airport                      | No sites in Borough  | Accident               |
| R95    | Nuclear Attack by a state on the UK mainland or UK overseas accident | Local Authority would take<br>direction from central<br>government | Hostile State Activity |
| R56    | Accidental Fire or explosion at an onshore major hazard (COMAH) site | No sites in Borough  | Accident               |

#### Appendix 1 - The 6 Stage Risk Assessment Process

#### 1. Contextualization

This is provided at the beginning of the document and summarizes a range of factors which influence the assessment of both likelihood and impact of risks in Wandsworth.

#### 2. Hazard Identification and allocation for assessment

Using London-risk as their basis, Richmond & Wandsworth Borough Resilience Forum identifies the threats and hazards that could give rise to an emergency within Richmond in the next 5 years.

#### 3. Risk analysis

Drawing on guidance from Government, other research and local knowledge, the lead assessor from the Borough Resilience Forum considers the likelihood of the risk over the next five-year period.

#### 4. Risk evaluation

The analysis is ratified by the Forum and collated in the Borough Risk Register.

#### 5. Risk treatment

Gaps in capability, compared to the Reasonable Worst Case Scenario risks are assessed periodically by the Borough

Resilience Forum. Options for additional risk management are developed.

#### 6. Monitoring and Review

Risk assessment is not a static process and is subject to constant review. At a minimum, each risk should be formally reviewed on a 2-year cycle alongside an annual update and re-publication of the Borough Risk Register.

#### Appendix 2 – Likelihood and Impact Scoring Scales – qualitative measures as stated in the London Risk Register

# Likelihood scoring scale

**Impact Categories** 

| Level | Descriptor  | Likelihood Over 5 Years | Likelihood Over 5 Years |
|-------|-------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1     | Low         | > 0.005%                | > 1 in 20,000 chance    |
| 2     | Medium Low  | > 0.05%                 | > 1 in 2,000 chance     |
| 3     | Medium      | > 0.5%                  | > 1 in 200 chance       |
| 4     | Medium High | > 5%                    | > 1 in 20 chance        |
| 5     | High        | > 50%                   | > 1 in 2 chance         |

#### Note:

Strictly, levels 1 and 2 of the impact scale are likely to fall below the threshold for an emergency. Consequently, there may be no statutory requirement to plan for events that score 1 or 2 on the impact scale. This scale recognizes that, to demonstrate a thorough analysis, Category 1 responders will wish to include in their risk assessment certain risks with impacts at these levels.

Further detail on the scoring measures is provided in Annex 4D of "Emergency Preparedness" (HM Government, 2005)

| Category           | Explanation   |
|--------------------|---|
| Human Welfare      | Includes numbers of fatalities and casualties resulting from the RWCS, needs for mass evacuation, and short- and long-term accommodation.   |
| Behavioral Impacts | Psychological impacts of the risk, including how people's perception and behavior might change because of the risk.   |
| Economic           | An approximate net economic cost, including both direct (e.g. loss of goods, buildings, infrastructure) and indirect (e.g. loss of business, increased demand for public services) costs      |
| Environment        | Encompassing contamination or pollution of land, water or air with harmful biological / chemical / radioactive matter or oil, flooding, or disruption or destruction of plant or animal life. |
| Essential Services | How the RWCs might impact the emergency services, critical infrastructure, transport, education and other service and infrastructure providers  |
| Security           | Includes impacts to law enforcement and intelligence services, and disruptions to criminal justice and boarder security   |

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# Appendix 3 – Risk Rating Definitions – qualitative measures as stated in the London Risk Register

| Definitions of Natior   | Definitions of Nationally Approved Risk Ratings  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Very high (VH) risk   | These are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic. |  |  |  |  |  |
| High (H) risk   | These risks are classed as significant. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as 'very high'. Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of at least (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and monitored on a regular frequency.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Medium (M) risk   | These risks are less significant, but may cause upset and inconvenience in the short term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed under generic emergency planning arrangements.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Low (L) risk These risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minin monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category. |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Based on the model risk rating matrix published in Annex 4F of "Emergency Preparedness" (HM Government, 2005)   |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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